Sunday, September 30, 2007

bad apples and institutionalisation

After listening to wednesday's lecture on the need to belong, I thought that I would add a couple of comments in relation to the point put forward that people have been institutionalised because they are considered "bad apples" (bad apple effect).

Firstly, having worked with clients who have been institutionalised for many years, I have observed that the concept of who should be institutionalised because they are "bad apples" has changed over the years. For example, many of the elderly people who resided in institutionalised settings in the past and now reside in residential settings were were placed in institutions because they were different or frail (including having hair lips, cleft pallets or hunch backs), or because they expressed antisocial behaviours that today would be corrected with parenting skills training or drugs such as Ritolin. These people, if born today, would receive medical or behavioural support while young, and be raised as normal children within the community.

Secondly, for those who were placed in institutions in the past, the flow-on effect has been life long, and consesquences of being judged different and in need of institutionalisation for many has been negative in some or many respects. For example, after years of exposure to institutional regimes, clients become dependent on others for support with all or many of their daily living needs including personal hygeine, banking, shopping, work, and attending social activities. Insitutional regimes result in clients becoming institutionalised in terms of daily routines so that they become anxious if routines are changed or if new people come into their environment and do not know the routines. Competitition in terms of survival of the fittest in institutions results in clients being constantly concerned about the safety of their own belongings and vigilent that their belongings are safely locked away where no-one else can get them. Competition for survival also results in clients hording or gorging their food so that no-one else can eat it. Also, people who have been institutionalised are exposed to public attitudes of prejudice based on the stereotype of insititutionalised people being violent, aggressive, and less than worthy of community membership.

A point that I would like to make is that people who have been classified in the past as "bad apples", and therefore placed in insitiutions have been exposed to a lifetime of treatment by institutions, fellow clients and society that they would not experience today because they would not be considered "bad apples", would hopefully receive the medical or behavioural support required to live as everyday citizens, and therefore would have the opportunity to grow from childhood into adulthood with independence and without experiencing the dependency, prejudice and isolation experienced in the past.

Thursday, September 20, 2007

stereotyping people with mental illness and disabilities

I read with interest Bec's blog on stereotypes relating to mental illness (http://beccakara.blogspot.com/). Having worked in disabilities for the last six years with people who have a dual diagnosis of intellectual disability and mental illness, there were some issues in the blog that struck a chord and that I would like to add further comment to.

In terms of stereotypes, Bec argued that "[the] most common stereotype is that mental illness sufferers are dangerous individuals", as "[they] lack the ability to control their behaviour and are unpredictable" (2007, para. 2). This is a stereotype that myself and colleagues are confronted with often by people in the community. For example, when asked by people from the wider community what we do for a living, myself and my colleagues have found that our explanation of our role as a carer for those with a dual diagnosis results in comments such as "oh, you work with those 'maddies'". Also, recently I was asked by a gentleman what I do for a living. When I explained that I work in group homes with people who have a disability or dual diagnosis, his face visibly changed from being warm and friendly to having a look of horror, and he immediately asked me if I am afraid of the clients because people like that are dangerous and violent.

Bec also stated that stereotyping of individuals who have a mental illness includes being classed as "inadequate in character and lacking in common sense and initiative" (2007, para. 3). May I add from experience that this stereotype is not only experienced by those with a mental illness or dual diagnosis. It is also a stereotype experienced by staff who care for them.
For example, I and my colleagues have regular contact with a health professional who I have observed treating members of our community who do not have a mental illness with respect, courtesy, and an assumption of intelligence. In contrast, myself, my colleagues and the clients we care for are treated by the same health professional in a condescending manner, with raised voice, exaggerated facial expressions, and with body language that suggests that the health professional does not want to get too close to any of us.

Bec (2007, paras. 5 & 6), has argued that mass media is responsible for the formation of stereotypes regarding people with a mental illness, and mass media is responsible for maintaining such stereotypes. Consistent with this argument, a report completed by the senate select committee on mental health (2006, p. 3) has found that the media does influence stereotypes of people with mental illness by reinforcing negative stereotypes, including representations of the mentally ill being violent, dangerous and unpredictable.

The senate select committee on mental health has also found though, that there are other social influences that have ensured the develpment and reinforcement of stereotypical misconceptions of people with a mental illness in our society. For example, in Australia mental health legislation makes reference to "detention and detainment" of the mentally ill, implying an association between mental illness and criminal behaviour (Senate Select Committee on Mental Health, 2006, p. 2). Also, in Australia, there are no standards for addressing misrepresentations in the media relating to mental illness (Senate Select Committee on Mental Health, 2006, p. 5).

Evidence suggests that stereotying of people who have a mental illness leads to stigmatisation (Senate Select Committee on Mental Health, 2006, p. 1). Evidence also suggests that stigmatisation influences prejudice experienced by people with a mental illness in terms of how they are treated by the wider community; the way in which people with a mental illness cope in society; and, the way in which society provides support for the mentally ill (Senate Select Committee on Mental Health, 2006, pp. 1-5). For example, it is argued that stigmatisation leads to discrimination against the mentally ill from various sectors of the community including health professionals, social organisations and the general population(Senate Select Committee on Mental Health, 2006, p. 1); stigmatisation leads to inhibition of the mentally ill in terms of seeking treatment support, and seeking employment and workplace support (Senate Select Committee on Mental Health, 2006, pp. 2&3); also, stigmatisation creates "barriers to mental health promotion" (Senate Select Committee on Mental Health, 2006, p. 5).

In her blog, Bec argued that one way of reducing stereotyping and stigmatisation of people with a mental illness is through education (2007, para. 7). According to the senate select committee on mental health (2006, p. 6), the media (which is currently held in some way responsible for stereotypical beliefs about people with a mental illness) would be a particularly effective forum for presenting health campaigns to increase public awareness and understanding of mental health issues, while reducing stigmatisation and prejudice associated with stereotypical beliefs related to the mentally ill.

References:

Bec's Blog (2007). Blog 1, Mental Illness Stereotypes. [online version] http://beccakara.blogspot.com/

Senate Select Committee on Mental Health (2006). Promotion, Prevention and Early Intervention. Parliament of Australia [online version] www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/mentalhealth_ctte/report/co7.htm.

Thursday, August 30, 2007

social psychological variables that influence behaviour

While completing my concept map for the Genocide Blog, I thought about how some of the key variables (such as ingroup/outgroup bias, prjudice, stereotypes and propaganda) that influenced the genocide in Rwanda exist in other societies including our own. For example, since 9/11 the Australian federal government has targeted people of middle eastern appearance through advertising campaings that have been used extensively in the media to request that Australians report anyone or anything that they think may be related to terrorism. The government has also used its own discretion to deport someone on the grounds of association with terrorists, even though the law did not support their actions. And finally, politicians such as Pauline Hanson has argued extensivley in the public forum that those of middle easter appearance are not welcome in Australia.

Though such actions have been taken in Australia and elsewhere, shaping peoples attitudes and creating disharmony in society, these variables have not caused the mass destruction that they have in countries like Rwanda. So, why does genocide occur in some countries and not in others when the social psychological variables that influenced the genocide exist in other societies as well?

One possible explanation is "political and psychological splitting of subject populations" (du Preez, 1997). According to du Preez, political splitting occurs when national identities are fragile and, rather than identifying as a whole, the nation is broken up into ethnic, racial and religious factions. Political splitting particularly occurs when one group within the nation as a surrogate power to dominate others based on racial superiority. For example, in Ceylon Britain used the Tamil to rule the Sinhalese, and in Rwanda Begium use the Tutsis to rule the Hutus (du Preez).

Du Preez (1997) argues that genocide cannot occur without political splitting. While this may be the case, there are other elements that occur in conjunction with political splitting that make the decision to commit genocide possible. For example, genocide becomes possible when surrogates loose power, are blamed for the misfortunes of others, and become vulneralbe to the actions of those who have replaced them (du Preez). Genocide also becomes possible when economic failure or war. War is important in terms of enabling genocide to occur because it allows for secrecy and permits strong measures to be taken by the current ruling party (du Preez). Finally, genocide can only be possible if the government in power is genocidal by nature because, "[w]ithout a genocidal party, there will be no genocide"(du Preez, p. 248).


Reference

du Preez, P. (1997). In Search of Genocide: A Comparison of Rwanda and South Africa [electronic version].

Wednesday, August 29, 2007

TOPIC: Blog 1: Genocide

ABSTRACT: "Genocide can be seen as occurring when a 'perfect storm' of social psychological variables come together. What might these social psychological variables be and how do they influence one another?"

Genocide in Rwanda - An Explanation of Social Psycholocial Vaiables That Came Together to Influence the Planning and Implementation of Genocide in 1994

INTRODUCTION

In April 1994, the world observed one of the most violent acts of genocide of the twentieth century (Smith, 1998). During the course of 100 days an estimated 800,000 (Barker, 2004) Hutu liberals and Tutsis were massacred in Rwanda. The genocide was planned and co-ordinated by the Hutu government (Gigliotti, 2007; Levine, 2000; Smith, 1998) and was implemented by up to 150,000 Rwandan military personnel, gendarmes and civilians (Smith, 1998).

In order for genocide to have taken place in Rwanda, several variables have come together to influence both the Hutu government’s decision that genocide was necessary (Smith, 1998), and participation by Rwandan citizens in the genocide (Sperling, 2006). According to Smith, the variables that came together to influence the genocide were modern and complex, and included pre colonial, colonial and postcolonial structural factors such as authoritarianism, anti-authoritarianism and ethnocentrism.

KEY VARIABLES THAT INFLUENCED GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

Authoritarianism occurred politically (Smith, 1998; Wessels, 1999) and culturally in Rwandan society (Smith, 1998), and evidence suggests that authoritarianism was a key variable in making genocide possible in Rwanda (Smith, 1998). Politically, authoritarian practices were normative during pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial period as successive governments used hierarchical political and social practices put in place by Belgian colonialists (Smith, 1998; Gigliotti, 2007; Wessels, 1999). Culturally, Rwandan families were authoritarian in nature, existing under patriarchal and centralised frameworks that encouraged tension, factionalism and conflict between family members (Smith, 1998).

Evidence suggests that a positive correlation exists between authoritarianism and violent tendencies (Benjamin, 2006). For example, a study has been undertaken by Oklahoma Panhandle State University to measure the correlation between authoritarianism and attitudes towards war (Benjamin, 2006). For this research 150 students (84 females and 64 males) were tested using the revised Attitudes Towards Violence Scale to measure attitudes towards war, penal code violence, and corporal punishment. Results of this study suggest that there is a “strong positive link between authoritarianism and attitudes toward war” (Benjamin, 2006, p. 925).

Another key variable influencing the genocide in Rwanda was prejudice which is a response based on stereotypical and derogatory beliefs about those who are different (Johnson, Terry & Louis, 2005). Prejudice was displayed by successive governments in Rwanda from the time of colonial rule (Smith, 1998). For example, when Belgium handed over political power to Rwanda in 1962 (Smith, 1998), they placed the Tutsis in government as they believed Tutsis looked more Caucasian than Hutus and were therefore racially superior (Sperling, 2006). Tutsis displayed prejudice towards Hutus while in government (Smith, 1998), and when Hutus came to power in 1973 they displayed prejudice towards the Tutsis in retaliation for treatment received in the past (Smith, 1998).

Two possible explanations for the prejudice displayed in Rwanda are the theory of political splitting and racial attitudes related to political change. Political splitting occurs when surrogate rulers have been put in place (du Preez, 1997) as occurred when Belgium placed Tutsis in government (Sperling, 2006), and when one section of a population is held responsible for disasters that occur to others (du Preez, 1997). One consequence of political splitting is that surrogates such as the Tutsis “become the targets of a hatred that combines opposition to the regime and any historical enmity that may already exist (du Preez, 1997, p. 246). Also, research on the relationship between racial attitudes and political change indicates that political change significantly influences levels of prejudice expressed towards others (Johnson, Terry & Louis, 2005). For example, research has been undertaken in Australia to measure predictors of prejudice by white Australians against Asian Australians based on racial attitudes and stereotypes (Johnson et al., 2005). For this research 265 participants answered questions relating to authoritarianism, instability, permeability, status, and subtle and blatant prejudice. Results of this research indicate that prejudice increases when political and economic environments change.

In Rwanda there were significant political and economic changes between 1988 and 1994 (Smith, 1998), as the Hutu government became increasingly greedy for wealth (Smith, 1998). Policies were put in place forcing landowners to grow coffee for export (Smith, 1998) and, based on in-group bias (Cohen, Montoya & Insko, 2006), profits from these crops went directly to the government (Smith, 1998). As a consequence of such government actions there was increased impoverishment, people were forced from the land, there was wide-spread famine, and there was a significant rise in anti-authoritarian attitudes towards the government (Smith, 1998).

According to Smith (1998), antiauthoritarian sentiment was the “single most acute source of the state’s murderous anxiety” prior to the genocide in 1994. This murderous anxiety was based on ethnocentric ideals (Smith, 1998), and resulted in the intricate planning of the genocide (Sperling, 2006), importing shipments of weapons (Sperling, 2006), training thousands of militia (2006), using propaganda to promote hatred for the Tutsis (Ogletree, 2003; Smith; Sperling), murdering the president (Barker, 2004; Smith, 1998; Sperling, 2006), and encouraging and participating in the genocide (Smith, 1998; Sperling, 2006).

PARTICIPATION IN THE GENOCIDE

Up to 150,000 Rwandans (Smith, 1998) including women and girls (Sperling, 2006), participated in the genocide. For genocide to occur on such a scale several social psychological variables have come together to influence individual desire to kill, and actual participation in the killing (Smith, 1998). Such variables may include in-group and out-group bias (Cohen, Montoya & Insko, 2006), retaliatory motivation (Topalli & O’Neil, 2003), external locus of control (Alegre & Murray, 1974), obedience (Geher, Bauman, Hubbard & Legare, 2002), behaviour imitation (Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1961), contagion (Levy, 1993), crowd behaviour (Patten & Arbolaeda-Florez, 2004), and weapons effect (Turner, Simons, Berkowitz & Frodi, 1977). One significant variable that may have influenced participation in the genocide was propaganda, which was used by the government to promote Tutsi hatred (Ogletree, 2003; Sperlin, 2006). For example, for several years government radio stated that Hutus had been victimised by Tutsis in the past, that Tutsis were subhuman (Sperling, 2006), and that genocide would cure all ethnic problems in Rwanda (Ogletree, 2003).

RELUCTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO INTERVENE

According to Ogletree (2003), while several variables influenced participation in the genocide, one variable stands out as significant in enabling the genocide to actually take place. That variable is the failure of the international community to intervene. For example, the international community was informed of what was happening prior to and during the genocide (Barker, 2004), but both the United Nations and United States stated that they would not intervene. Consequently, the Hutu government were able to plan and implement the genocide knowing there would be no opposition from the international community (Barker, 2004).

One possible explanation for the lack of intervention by the international community is correspondence bias which occurs when individuals “underestimate the impact of social forces on behaviour” (Forsyth, 2004, p. 42), fail to realise that individuals can experience significant pressure to obey (Forsyth), and perceive that the actions of individuals are “freely chosen” (Forsyth, 2004, p. 42). Research has been undertaken in the United States to assess correspondence bias (Forsyth, 2004). For this research 221 students (144 females and 69 males) provided their own responses and their view of other’s responses to an essay they had read. Results of this research indicate that people justify their own actions based on their own perceptions of a situation (Forsyth, 2004). In the case of Rwanda, it is possible that correspondence bias occurred because it has been argued that the international community was told what was going on, but they didn't understand (Barker, 2004).

Another possible explanation for the lack of intervention by the international community is prejudice combined with social influence (Vescio, Gervais, Heidenreich & Snyder, 2006). Research has been undertaken in the United States to measure the relationship between prejudice and social influence amongst white Americans. For this research 61 participants (28 males and 33 females) participated in a supervisory task based on their assessments of stereotypical weaknesses. Results of this research indicate in part, that “[p]owerful people will exhibit stereotype-based judgements and behaviour when cultural stereotypes of the groups to which low power people belong match and inform their goal-seeking strategies” (Vescio et al., 2006, p. 448). In the case of Rwanda, prejudice combined with social influence were demonstrated by the actions of the international community including the United Nations which refused to intervene, in part, because it was planning interventions based on United States interests (Barker, 2004), and the United States and Britain who “deliberately tried to stop countries [from] sending troops…” (Barker, 2004) to Rwanda. According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Barker, 2004) such prejudice existed in the international community because the international community discriminated against Rwanda, believing that Rwanda was a “second-class” operation, and also believing that African people did not deserve the assistance that had been given to others.

CONCLUSION

Had the international community intervened in Rwanda it is possible that many lives could have been saved. While this may be the case, it still remains that there were several social psychological variables that influenced the genocide in Rwanda (see Appendix A). Some variables such as authoritarianism and prejudice existed from the time of Belgian colonial rule, while others such as government anxiety and propaganda were created as a consequence of variables such as authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. Some variables such as prejudice and stereotyping existed, not only in Rwanda, but also within the international community. As a result of the social psychological variables that came together in Rwanda in 1994, the world was witness to one of the most violent acts of genocide of the 20th century, a genocide that was planned, implemented and participated in by Hutu government officials and citizens in the knowledge that the international community would not intervene.


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References

Alegre, C. & Murray, E. J. (1974). Locus of Control, Behavioural Intention and Verbal Conditioning [Electronic version]. Journal of Personality, 42(4), 668-681.

Bandura, A., Ross, D. & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of Aggression Through Imitation of
Aggressive Models [Electronic version]. Ontario: York University.

Barker, G. (Producer/Director). (2004). Ghosts of Rwanda. Boston: WBGA Education
Foundation.

Benjamin, A. J. (2006). The Relationship Between Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Attitudes Toward Violence: Further Validation of the Attitudes Toward Violence Scale [Electronic version]. Social Behaviour and Personality, 34 (8), 923-926.

Cohen, T. R., Montoya, R. M. & Insko, C. A. (2006). Group Morality and Intergroup Relations: Cross-Cultural and Experimental Evidence [Electronic version]. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32 (11), 1559-1572.

Du Preez, P. (1997). In Search of Genocide: A Comparison of Rwanda and South Africa [Electronic version]. Peace and Conflict, 3 (3), 245-257.

Forsyth, D. R. (2004), Inferences About Actions Performed In Constraining Contexts: Correspondence Bias or Correspondent Inference? [Electronic version]. Current Psychology, 23 (1), 41-51.

Geher, G., Bauman, K., Hubbard, S. E. K. & Legare, J. R. (2002). Self and Other Obedience Estimates: Biases and Moderators [Electronic version]. Journal of Social Psychology, 142 (6).

Gigliotti, S. (2007). Genocide Yet Again: Scenes of Rwanda and Ethical Witness in the Human Rights Memoir [Electronic version]. The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 53 (1), 84-94.

Johnson, D., Terry, D. J. & Louis, W. R. (2005). Perceptions of the Intergroup Structure and Anti-Asian Prejudice Among White Australians [Electronic version]. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 8 (1), 53-71.

Levine, M. (2000). Why is the Twentieth Century the Century of Genocide? [Electronic version]. Journal of World History, 11 (2), 305-310.

Levy, D. A. (1993). Contagion: A Theoretical and Empirical Review and Reconceptualization [Electronic version]. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 119 (2), 235-241.

Ogletree, A. P. (2004). Origins of Rwandan Genocide [Electronic version]. The Western Journal of Black Studies, 28 (2), 397-938.

Patten, S. B. & Arboleda-Florez, J. A. (2004). Epidemic theory and group violence [Electronic version]. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 39, 853-856.

Smith, D. N. (1998). The Psycholocultural Roots of Genocide, Legitimacy and Crisis in Rwanda [Electronic version]. American Psychologist, 53 (7), 743-753.

Sperling, C. (2006). Pauline Nyiramasuhuko’s Role in the Rwandan Genocide [Electronic version]. Fordham Urban Law Journal, 33 (2), 637-661.

Topalli, V., & O’Neal, E. C. (2003). Retaliatory Motivation Enhances Attributions of Hostility When People Process Ambiguous Social Stimuli [Electronic version]. Aggressive Behaviour, 29, 155-192

Turner, C. W., Simons, L. S., Berkowitz, L. & Frodi, A. (1977). The Stimulating and Inhibiting Effects of Weapons on Aggressive Behaviour [Electronic version]. Aggressive Behaviour, 3, 355-378.

Vescio, T. K., Gervais, S. J., Heidenreich, S. & Snyder, M. (2006). The Effects of Prejudice Level and Social Influence Strategy on Powerful People’s Responding to Racial Out-group Members [Electronic version]. European Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 435-450.

Wessells, M. G. (1999). Systemic Approaches to the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide and Mass Killing. Peace and Conflict, 5 (4). 365-370.

Sunday, August 12, 2007

The social world of the "computer"

I would like to respond to "WillingParticipant"'blog posing about radio national's programme on digital households. Though I use the computer and internet myself I have never seen the internet as a particularly positive form of social connection that enhances my children's lives. Instead I have been one of those parents who have seen the computer as a time waster; something that reduces physical activity and inhibits social connections with family and friends.

I agree with WillingParticpant's argument that there is a conceptual gap between generations relating to use of the internet. I think this gap exists for a variety of reasons including the way generations percieve the potential use of computers, the way generations choose to socialise with one another, and language used in the internet world. I also think though, that there are cultural and social influences that affect how parents perceive the internet, particularly in terms of the harm it can cause their children. For example, all parents face the responsibility of helping their children to survive both physically and mentally to adulthood. With this in mind, parents fear things that they perceive may cause harm to their children. Social and cultural influences including the media and government constantly place pressure on parents to be aware of the evils of the internet such as child pornography and predatory behaviour. Also, governments and health agencies promote the concept that comupters and t.v. games are significanlty responsibile for obesity in young people today.


WillingParticipant argued that children in the age of the internet are socialised both in the real world and in the online world, can move between both, and know the standards that are acceptable in each world. While this may be the case, it appears to me that at times the online world encroaches on the real world and this can result in people being at risk of harm or feeling isolated. For example, what happens when a 12 year old thinks they are talking online with another young person, arranges to meet up and eventually finds out that the person they were talking to is 52 and has a history of offences against children? What happens when online speak becomes community speak and no-one else can understand what is being said (this is happening in my sons work currently and is a source of much angst amonst staff who cannot use internet talk)?. Also, what happens when children think they are talking safely amonst themselves and make inappropriate comments in jest only to find that someone else has reported their comments elsewhere and the children are in trouble with authorities or are made to receive psychiactric treatment (as happened to boys from Crookwell highschool recently)?

On a lighter and more positive note, I will finish this blog entry by thanking WillingParticipant for writing an informative email from the perspective of someone who uses the internet as a method of social contact and who could succinctly give a perspective of this source of communication through positive eyes

Wednesday, August 1, 2007

Genocide

Like several other students in the class, I am interested in doing my first blog on the Genocide theme.

It seems to me that many factors come into play that influence individuals to participate in genocidal behaviour. For example, biographical details of Klaus Barbie indicate that several social factors influenced his readiness to participate in the German atrocities of ww11. Academic failure, unemployment, poverty, need for companionship, and blaming others for deaths in his family and ruining his own life. Such circumstances placed Barbie (along with many others in Germany at the time) in a position where he was vulnerable to the propaganda of the Nazis.

Also, as argued by Bec in her blog, behaviour and identity change with changing situations. In his book "Ordinary Men", Christopher Browning highlights how, consistent with Milgram's experiment, humans can be made to harm others even if what they are doing goes against their own beliefs. "Ordinary Men" discusses the actions of a group of police officers in Poland who were conscripted in ww11 to kill Jewish prisoners on mass. None of these officers had killed before and some were friends with Jewish people. Of the police officers chosen for the task, all fired their guns at the Jewish prisoners, one or two chose to fire their guns to the side of the prisoners and therefore did not kill, and the remainder of the officers conformed with the instructions given to them, killing all prisoners. After all prisoners were killed, the officers returned to their normal lives, having committed crimes that they did not choose to commit, but felt compelled to commit because they were instructed to do so by what they saw as a higher and powerful authority. http://www.wowessays.com/dbase/af4/lvw182.shtml.

Saturday, July 28, 2007

test posting

Just testing to see if this works. Haven't got a clue what I'm doing!!!!!